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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. (not incarcerated) 
RICHARD FRANKLIN NORRIS, 
: Case No. 20030817-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD. 
In State v, Norris. 2004 UT App 267, 2004 WL 1794474, this Court held that the 
communications fraud statute is constitutional, and rejected challenges to its vagueness 
and overbreadth. Id. at ffl[ 8-16, The State has filed a letter of supplemental authority 
with the Court asserting that the Norris decision disposes of the challenges to the 
communications fraud statute in Norris' opening brief in this case. 
The doctrine of horizontal stare decisis generally requires the panels of this Court 
to follow the decisions of all other panels. See, e.g.. Bonneville Asphault v. Labor 
Com'n, 2004 UT App. 137, If 16, 91 P.3d 849. 
However, the doctrine is not mandatoiy. If this Court believes that another panel's 
decision is clearly erroneous, and does not do so lightly, the Court may overrule the 
decision of another panel. See, e ^ , Manning v. State, 89 P.3d 196 (Utah App. 2004). 
The Norris decision is clearly erroneous and should be set aside, because in 
finding that the communications fraud statute is not constitutionally overbroad, Norris 
relies on New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 and n. 19 (1964), a civil libel 
case involving a public official. Sullivan does not stand for the proposition propounded 
by Norris - that all knowing or recklessly-made falsehoods are constitutionally 
unprotected speech, see Norris at ^ 11. Rather, Sullivan, which places the burden on a 
public official to prove knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth in order to 
obtain a judgment for libel, is premised on the need for free public debate on public 
figures and their political service, and thus sets a high civil burden for public officials to 
meet in order to sue someone for libel. See id. In Sullivan, the Court "designed a 
constitutional privilege intended to free criticism of public officials from the restraints 
imposed by the common law of defamation," Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323 
(1973). Sullivan is thus unique to its context and inapposite to the context of a criminal 
fraud statute. 
Like the Norris decision, the State's brief in this case relies on Sullivan and I.M.L., 
2002 UT 1105 61 P.3d 1038, in arguing that the communications fraud statute 
appropriately criminalizes fraudulent conduct by requiring proof of at least reckless 
disregard for the truth. State's brief at 20. I.M.L. involved a libel statute which the court 
stmck because it failed to satisfy the law and rationale of Sullivan, in failing to define the 
element of malice in constitutional terms, and in failing to provide truth as a defense. 
2 
See id. I.M.L., like Sullivan, is thus inapposite. 
The State's reliance on State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987), State's brief 
at 20, is likewise misplaced, because Frampton only establishes that acts executed with an 
intent to defraud are not constitutionally protected, and does not shield the 
communications fraud statute from constitutionally scrutiny, because the communications 
fraud statute does not require intent to defraud as a necessaiy element, but creates 
criminal liability in cases involving falsehoods uttered intentionally or recklessly to gain 
something of value, an intent that is present virtually anytime someone intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly utters a falsehood. See § 76-10-1801(1). 
Frampton. I.M.L. and Sullivan are inapposite to this context, which involves a 
criminal fraud statute which does not require proof of intent to defraud, but will permit a 
conviction based on a falsehood uttered with the intent to obtain anything of value, and 
thus applies to virtually all intentionally or recklessly uttered falsehoods, regardless of 
whether they are fraudulent. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). 
The State's argument that the statute's requirement of proof of intentional, 
knowing or reckless falsehood constitutes an element requiring proof of intent to defraud, 
State's brief at 19, is incorrect. The statute itself does permit a conviction based 
expressly on 
dishonest communication in furtherance of a scheme to defraud, but also permits 
convictions to enter on the basis of a different and far broader theoiy - communication in 
furtherance of a scheme to obtain anything of value by means of false pretenses. See § 
3 
76-10-1801. It is axiomatic that all statutory language is presumed to have been 
intentionally adopted by the legislature, and should be given effect by the courts. See, 
e.g., Norris, at f 10. 
The pertinent constitutional decisions in the context of criminal fraud statutes 
confirm that the Utah communications fraud statute is substantially constitutionally 
overbroad, because under its plain terms, it makes a second degree felony of any 
intentional or recklessly uttered falsehood designed to obtain something of value, without 
requiring any intent to defraud or success in defrauding. See id. Thus, it encompasses a 
wide array of communicative conduct which is not fraudulent. Compare LaFave, 
Criminal Law, Chapter 8, § 90 (discussing fraud and other crimes falling under the rubric 
of false pretenses, which normally have the following elements: u(l) a false 
representation of a material present or past fact; (2) which causes the victim; (3) to pass 
title to (4) his propeity to the wrongdoer, (5) who (a) knows his representation to be false 
and (b) intends thereby to defraud the victim."). 
The Utah communications fraud statute applies to many kinds of constitutionally 
protected speech, such as commentary on the functioning of the government,1 political 
1When national leadership seeks to justify the war in with false allegations of 
weapons of mass destruction, is this a second degree felony? See, e.g.. Village of 
Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (First 
Amendment protects "communication of information, the dissemination and propagation 
of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes."). 
4 
debate,2 religious speech,3 and all manner of interpersonal communications.4 
Criminal fraud statutes which impinge on First Amendment activities must be 
drawn with ''narrow specificity" so that constitutionally-protected speech is not chilled or 
punished criminally as a byproduct of or direct application of an overbroad criminal 
fraud statute. See, Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment 444 U S. 
620 (1980); Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co.. 467 U.S. 947 
(1984); Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina. 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
In Village of Schaumberg. the Court struck on First and Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds an ordinance punishing organizations for soliciting charitable contributions if 
those organizations used less than 75% of the donations for anything but the charitable 
puipose advertised. The government claimed that the ordinance was valid and necessary 
to protect the public from "'fraud, crime and annoyance/' and the Court agreed that these 
2When a political candidate falsely promises that she will not raise taxes to garner 
votes, is this a second degree felony? See, e.g.. Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a 
Better Environment 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (First Amendment protects 
'communication of information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, 
and the advocacy of causes.'5). 
3When a religious leader falsely promises eternal glory to those who will do his 
bidding in a holy war, is this a second degree felony? See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 
U.S. 263, 269 (1981) (religious speech and worship protected speech under First 
Amendment). 
4If a woman falsely pledges to love a man forever in exchange for physical 
affection, is this a second degree felony? See, e.g., Provo City v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 
458 (Utah 1989) (recognizing First Amendment protection of private speech and conduct 
between consenting adults). 
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were valid interests. See, id. at 636. However, because many legitimate charitable 
organizations might use more than 25% of their solicitations for valid puiposes other than 
direct donations to their identified charitable causes, the Court found that the Constitution 
would not permit the government to label such organizations as fraudulent or to prohibit 
them from soliciting funds. Id. at 637. The Court held that the government could serve 
the interests, but would be required to do so through "narrowly drawn" regulations, 
concluding, "'Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect. 
Precision of regulation must be the touchstone . . . . ' " Id. at 637, quoting NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). 
Similarly and to a much greater degree, the Utah communications fraud statute 
sweeps within its ambit a huge amount of expressive conduct that does not qualify as 
fraudulent, see, ej^, LaFave, supra, and the government's interest in preventing fraud can 
and must be met in a far narrower statute than the communications fraud statute. 
Compare Village of Schaumberg, supra. See also Secretary of State of Maryland v. 
Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 961-62, 965-68 (1984) (noting that Court in 
Schaumberg struck ordinance because there was no connection between fraud and much 
of the constitutionally protected speech to which the ordinance ostensibly applied, the 
Court stmck a similar law pertaining to charitable solicitation, because there was "no core 
of easily identifiable and constitutionally prescribable conduct that the statute prohibits" 
and thus, the statute unnecessarily risked the chilling of free speech); Riley v. National 
Federation of the Blind of North Carolina. 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (striking statute similar to 
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that in Schaumberg and Munson after subjecting it to stiict scmtiny and concluding that it 
was not narrowly tailored to the goals of fraud prevention and other related goals in 
charitable solicitations). 
Because the Utah communications fraud statute has "no core of easily identifiable 
and constitutionally proscribable conduct/5 and thus risks the chilling of free speech, and 
because the goal of fraud prevention can easily be attained by far narrower means, this 
Court should strike the communications statute on overbreadth grounds. See 
Schaumberg, Munson, and Riley, supra. 
II. 
THE UTAH COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE. 
In the Norris decision, this Court rejected vagueness challenges to the terms 
"artifice," "communicate55 and "anything of value55 in the communications fraud statute. 
State v. Norris. 2004 UT App 267, fflf 12-16, 2004 WL 1794474. This portion of Norris 
should be carefully reconsidered and overruled, because it is premised on the erroneous 
conclusion that no constitutionally protected conduct is proscribed and chilled by the 
statute, because the statute requires proof of actual malice and thus comports with New 
York Times v. Sullivan, supra, Norris. 2004 UT App 267, fflf 11 and 12- T h e State's 
brief in this case contains the argument adopted in Norris. State's brief at 21-24. 
The communications fraud statute applies to all manner of constitutionally 
protected speech, including political debate, religious persuasion, and interpersonal 
communications. See, e.g.. Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment 
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444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (First Amendment protects "communication of information, the 
dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes."). 
As discussed above, Sullivan does not stand for the proposition that all falsehoods 
uttered intentionally or with reckless disregard for their truth are not entitled to 
constitutional protection, and is inapposite to this context. 
Because the communications fraud statute does apply to constitutionally protected 
speech and conduct, the Norris decision and the State's brief are in error in requiring one 
challenging this statute to prove it "Vague in all of its applications.'" Norris at f^ 12 
(citation omitted); State's brief at 22. 
In discussing the term "artifice," the Norris Court held that the statute proscribes 
only those artifices involving an intent to "inter alia defraud others." Norris at f^ 13 
(emphasis added), and essentially adopted the argument in the State's brief in this case. 
State's brief at 22-23. 
While the communications fraud statute certainly does proscribe artifices "to 
defraud another," it is the "inter alia" portion of the statute that poses the vagueness 
problem, for whether something is "of value" and qualifies for prosecution under the 
statute is truly in the eye of the beholder, or police officer, prosecutor, judge or jury 
charged with applying this incredibly versatile law. But see, e.g., Grayned v. Rockford, 
408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (vagueness doctiine requires laws not only to give citizens 
notice of proscribed behavior, but also prevents those who are to enforce the laws from 
8 
exercising what should be the legislative prerogative in discriminatory application of 
vague laws). 
The Court found that the term "communicate" was not unduly vague just because 
the definition was broad, but apparently was not presented with, and did not reach the 
critical aspect of the argument raised in this case - that the statute fails to specify whether 
one communication uttered to many justifies multiple counts. See Norris, at ^ 14. In its 
brief in this case, the State recognizes but does not address the argument about the 
number of recipients and the number of counts, other than perfunctorily concluding that 
the number of counts is determined by subsection (5) of the statute. State's brief at 23, 
26-27. 
While subsection (5) of the statute does clearly permit a separate charge for each 
communication, subsection (6) of the statute, which defines the phrase "to communicate," 
is ambiguous as to whether communication is determined by the defendant's act of 
uttering, or on the defendant's act in successfully communicating to a recipient.5 In the 
former case, depending on how it is broadcast, one utterance might support one charge or 
many, and in the latter, one utterance would seem to sustain as many charges as there 
5Subsection (6) provides, 
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to 
bestow, convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of 
information; to talk over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the 
mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and 
spoken and written communication. 
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exercising what should be the legislative prerogative in discriminatory application of 
vague laws). 
The Court found that the term "communicate" was not unduly vague just because 
the definition was broad, but apparently was not presented with, and did not reach the 
critical aspect of the argument raised in this case - that the statute fails to specify whether 
one communication uttered to many justifies multiple counts. See Norris, at ^ 14. In its 
brief in this case, the State recognizes but does not address the argument about the 
number of recipients and the number of counts, other than perfunctorily concluding that 
the number of counts is determined by subsection (5) of the statute. State's brief at 23. 
26-27. 
While subsection (5) of the statute does clearly permit a separate charge for each 
communication, subsection (6) of the statute, which defines the phrase uto communicate/* 
is ambiguous as to whether communication is determined by the defendant's act of 
uttering, or on the defendant's act in successfully communicating to a recipient.5 In the 
former case, depending on how it is broadcast, one utterance might support one charge or 
many, and in the latter, one utterance would seem to sustain as many charges as there 
5Subsection (6) provides, 
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to 
bestow, convey, make known, recount,, impart; to give by way of 
information; to talk over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the 
mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and 
spoken and written communication. 
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were recipients.6 
In rejecting a vagueness challenge to the phrase "anything of value/5 the Noms 
Court speculated that most communications fraud cases would be prosecuted for schemes 
designed to obtain "money or property," and concluded that the statute would thus be 
"valid in the vast majority of its intended applications." Id. at % 15, citing Hill v. 
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 733 (2000). 
Hill does recognize that courts faced with vagueness challenges should refrain 
from launching off into unlikely hypothetical applications of statutes, see id, but does not 
authorize courts to ignore statutory language, and/or to assume that prosecutions will not 
be brought under theories of prosecution authorized by the plain terms of the statute. See 
id. 
While the Norris Court was disinclined to permit a challenge to the "anything of 
6In Norris' instant case, the prosecution's apparent theoiy underlying the two 
counts for each victim was that Norris communicated to each of them twice - once 
through a newspaper advertisement, and once in personal meetings (R. 9-10); R. 1867 at 
221). The evidence at the preliminary hearing arguably involved many more 
communications, because Norris had ongoing employment relationships with many of the 
victims. See Norris' opening brief at 8-10 n.2 (summarizing the preliminary hearing 
evidence). It was not clear from the preliminary hearing that all of the victims saw 
separate or unique newspaper advertisements, and it appears that one newspaper 
advenisement or other communication might be viewed as justifying a separate charge for 
each person who received the communication. See id and R. 9-10. 
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor argued that he could have charged a 
separate count for each communication received by each victim, including counts for 
each victim who read a newspaper article, and for each victim who heard Norris speak in 
a group meeting (R. 1868 at 34). 
10 
value" language because Nonis was charged with a scheme to defraud people of money 
in that case, Nonis, % 15, in this case, all of the many information filed against Nonis 
alleged that his scheme was designed to obtain money "or anything of value." See 
Addendum to Nonis' opening brief (containing informations). Reviewing the evidence at 
the preliminary hearing confirms that some of Nonis's conduct at issue may have been 
charged exclusively under the "anything of value" language, given that the goals of his 
schemes alleged at the preliminary hearing varied from getting people to work for him 
without paying them as promised in advertisements or oral representations, or suing 
people for damages after they failed to comply with their contractual obligations. 
See Nonis' opening brief at 8-10 n.2 (summarizing preliminary hearing evidence).7 
The Nonis decision does not address the aggregation issue, which the State 
dismisses with the argument that the communications fraud statute clearly requires 
separate charges for each communication, which are individually classified by level 
according to the aggregated damages in all counts. State's brief at 27, 32. 
In making this argument, the State does not address the many interpretations of the 
aggregation and unit of prosecution portions of the statute in this case, which many 
7The State notes that Nonis has not claimed that his conduct was constitutionally 
protected. Because the government has never been required to provide a bill of 
particulars or otherwise specify which of Nonis' communications and/or conduct are at 
issue in this case, Nonis is not in a fair position to assert that his conduct is 
constitutionally protected. At a minimum, under Schaumberg's recognition that the 
communication of information is constitutionally protected, Nonis' conduct qualifies for 
First Amendment protection. 
11 
interpretations confirm that because the communications fraud statute is so vague, it can 
and will be applied in radically disparate fashions, depending on the identity and 
Temperament of the prosecutor, judge or jurors. See Norris' opening brief at 25-27. 
Because the communications fraud statute does not give adequate notice of 
proscribed conduct to citizens, and fails to limit the discretion of those charged with 
enforcing the statute, this Court should strike the statute on vagueness grounds. See, e g., 
Grayned, supra. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER NORRIS' CASE. 
The State argues that Norris' argument regarding the trial court's lack of 
jurisdiction "omits a crucial fact: the misdemeanor appeal was remitted before the State 
filed the May 15 information." State's brief at 36. 
Norris did not omit this fact. He acknowledged the May 15 issuance of the 
remittitur in his statement of facts, and then discussed how the remittitur was recalled as 
premature and held in this Court until October 30, 1998. Norris opening brief at 5-7. In 
his argument in the opening brief, Norris relied on Hi-Country Estates Homeowners 
Ass'n v. Foothills Water Company, 942 P.2d 3035 (Utah 1996) (per curiam), because 
that case demonstrates that if a remittitur issues prematurely, informations filed in the 
district court are null and void. Norris opening brief at 37-38. 
The State claims that Hi-Country is not relevant, supporting or controlling 
12 
authority for Nonis' position, because the distiict courts' acceptance of the informations 
in the distiict court while the case was on appeal did not affect the parties' rights. State's 
brief at 38. 
This argument fails to account for Nonis's repeated arrests and increases in bail 
and for the statute of limitations, which would have run before the remittitur issued had 
the district court not accepted the infonnations before the remittitur issued properly from 
this Court. 
The State claims that Nielson v. Schiller, 66 P.2d 365 (Utah 1937), condones the 
actions of the district court in permitting infonnations to be re-filed before the remittitur 
issued properly from this Court. State's brief at 37. 
Nielson stands for the propositions that when one court has exercised jurisdiction 
in a case, a second court may not, and that if a second court does so act, the orders of that 
court are to be vacated and set aside. Id. at 368. Accordingly, the infonnations signed by 
Magistrate/Judge Reese while the case was on appeal and pending a motion to dismiss 
with prejudice before Judge Dever (e.g. R. 10, 56), should be vacated and set aside. 
See id. 
In arguing that there was no violation of the concunent jurisdiction doctrine, the 
State claims that u[t]he State filed it's action in the distiict court in the belief that the 
misdemeanor appeal was completed." State's brief at 39. This assertion is not supported 
by citation to the record, likely because the record contradicts the assertion. The State 
13 
refiled the case twice before the remittitur issued prematurely, and was informed by 
Judge Palmer that he would not hear the case until the West Valley case was completely 
disposed of (R. 131), and was informed by Judge Dever that the State could not refile 
until the remittitur issued (R. 34, 166; R. 1860 at 27). The State not only refiled the case 
when the remittitur issued prematurely (R. 12-21), and while a motion to dismiss with 
prejudice was pending before Judge Dever (R. 10, 56), but was informed at the time that 
Judge Reese permitted the refiling and signed the information on May 15, 1997 that it 
could not proceed until the remittitur arrived (R. 156). 
The State's conduct thus does not reflect a good faith belief that the misdemeanor 
appeal was completed, but reflects disregard for the law of the case as set forth by Judge 
Palmer that the State could not refile until the West Valley appeal was disposed of, and 
bad faith forum shopping and violation of Norris' due process rights. But see Mascaro v. 
Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 946 (Utah 1987) (uone district court judge cannot overrule another 
district court judge of equal authority."); State v. Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, ^  17 n.5; 89 
P.3d 191 ("Forum shopping occurs when "a criminal prosecution [is] shuttled from one 
magistrate to another simply because a county attorney is not satisfied with the action of 
the magistrate in the precinct whose jurisdiction was first invoked." Brickey, 714 P.2d at 
647 (quotations and citation omitted). To eliminate this practice, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that "when a charge is refiled, the prosecutor must, whenever possible, refile the 
charges before the same magistrate." Id."). 
14 
Contiaiy to the State's peifunctory and unsupported claim, State's bnef at 39-40, 
permitting the lefilmg in the absence of a validly issued lemittitui thus violated, lathei 
than satisfied, the concunent junsdiction doctnne 
In disputing Noms' claim that the due piocess violations and piosecutonal 
vmdictiveness constitute subject mattei juiisdictional issues, the State seeks to distinguish 
Blackledge v Perry, 417 U S 21 (1974), by noting that Blackledge's letiial was viewed 
as vindictive because it appealed that he was being punished for exeicismg his light to 
appeal, wheieas in this case, it was West Valley City, and not Noms, who took the 
appeal State's bnef at 42-43 
While the West Valley City piosecutois ongmally took the appeal, West Valley 
then moved to dismiss it in oidei to facilitate felony chaiges by the county (R 742), and 
it was Mi Noms who pursued the appeal, by filing vanous motions and petitions in this 
Court, the Utah Supieme Court, and the United States Supreme Court (e g , R 41 211 
214) Given the accuiate history of this case and the substantial mciease in chaiges and 
bail, Blackledge and the othei authoiities cited in Noms' opening bnef but not addiessed 
by the State establish due process violations defeating the tnal court's subject mattei 
iiuisdiction See Noms' opening bnef at 45-48 
On the ments. the State disputes that there was any due piocess violation oi any 
piosecutonal vmdictiveness, claiming that "the multiple information filings and increase 
in chaiges" "lepiesent only the piosecution's good faith attempts to place the piosecution 
15 
and the results of an on-going investigation before the appropriate court [.f Stated brief 
at 45. 
The record contradicts the argument. The record demonstrates that while the 
original misdemeanor case was pending on appeal, the prosecution refiled the case three 
times, increasing the charges from four misdemeanors (R. 165, 621-22), to eleven third 
degree felonies (R. 49-53), to ten third degree felonies (R. 55-58), to twenty third degree 
felonies (R. 12-21). The informations were twice filed before differeni judges (Dever and 
Reese) after the first two judges (Palmer and Dever) ruled that the refiling could not 
occur until after the West Valley appeal was complete (R. 131, 34, 166, R. 1860 at 27). 
and at least two of the refiled informations reflected that no prior informations had been 
refiled (R. 11, 60), when this was not the case. But see, Atencio, supra. The 
informations were repeatedly based on a police report that should have been expunged 
(R. 11, 60). The bail increased from $75,000 to $150,000 (R. 55, 62). 
In support of its continuing investigation claim, the State cites to a memorandum 
drafted for the signature of deputy district attorney Greg Bown, reflecting that the four 
misdemeanor charges increased to ten felony charges on the basis of tcnot only ... the 
conduct of the defendant as represented by the conduct involved in the Judge Watson 
case and additional similar conduct involving additional victims which had been 
discovered subsequently to the filing of the misdemeanors by the West Valley City 
Prosecutors." (R. 1788-89). State's brief at 46. However, this memorandum was never 
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signed by Mr. Bown or anyone else. 
At the hearing on April 14, 1997, counsel for Norris indicated that all of the 
victims in the felony counts, including those who were not named in the original West 
Valley charges, were witnesses and potential victims in that original case (R. 1860 at 16). 
The prosecutor at that hearing, Ernie Jones, did not dispute that claim, or claim that the 
additional charges were the result of any ongoing investigation, but simply claimed that 
the additional victims in the refiled counts were not named in the original West Valley 
counts (R. 1860 at 5-12). 
The record and the refiled informations, which are signed and sworn to under oath, 
all reflect that the charges are based on the same original police report filed in the West 
Valley case, which police report should have been expunged (R. 9, 49-53, 128, 165, 176-
80, 218-223, 281, R. 1860 at 5-10, 12-13, 20). The fact that the same original police 
report was the basis for these prosecutions counters the unsupported claim that the 
increased charges were the product of an ongoing investigation. 
Thus, the Court should reject the claim that the increase in charges was the result 
of an ongoing investigation, and should accurately characterize the escalating charges and 
bail and other improprieties as blatant proof of prosecutorial vindictiveness and violation 
of due process, which defeated the district court's subject matter jurisdiction over this 
case. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should strike the communications fraud statute on constitutional 
grounds and/or hold that as a result of its egregious violations of due process of law, the 
State may not reprosecute Mr. Norris. 
Respectfully submitted on August 26, 2004 
/ W -w 
Elizibeth'Hitott 
i 
Counsel for Mi*. Norris 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing reply 
brief of appellant to Assistant Attorney General Kris Leonard, Heber Wells Building, 160 
East 300 South, 6th Floor. P.O. Box 140854. Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854. this 
August 26, 2004. 
18 
